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1019 
PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
FOG 
Sarah Aitchison* 
Abstract: The Cloud has changed how individuals record, store, and aggregate their 
personal information. As technology’s capacity for holding an individual’s most intimate 
details and recording day-to-day experiences increases, Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections become less equipped to respond to technological advances. These advances 
allow private companies to store an immense amount of their consumers’ personal 
information, and government entities to obtain that information. In response, tech companies 
have begun refusing to comply with government demands for information collected and 
stored in their devices and in the Cloud, and are increasingly ending up in court, fighting 
orders to disclose consumer information. A dynamic tension has developed between the 
United States government’s desire and increased capacity to obtain information about 
consumers, and tech companies wanting to keep their consumers’ information private. The 
relevant statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), is not equipped to 
address these technological advances. The Supreme Court’s extensive Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and guidelines for addressing Fourth Amendment issues are similarly ill-suited 
to answer the novel and unique issues that accompany digital, remote storage of personal 
information. This Comment identifies the inadequacies of ECPA and the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as they each apply to technological advances and the potential of Cloud data. It 
argues that Congress must revise the legislative scheme to adequately protect information 
stored in the Cloud, particularly addressing whether consumers have a right to know when 
their information is being accessed by the United States government. Further, it argues courts 
lack the tools to adequately amend, reframe, repeal, or apply ECPA, and thus should not be 
the primary body making decisions about the bounds of technologically based government 
collection under the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, if the legislature does not act, courts 
will remain required to make findings related to whether the collection of information is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Courts should, then, recognize that digital data deserves 
a fundamentally distinct analysis and discontinue the trend of finding attenuated connections 
between classic surveillance techniques and government surveillance using advanced 
technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last five years, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), Apple, Inc. 
(Apple), and Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) have all been subject to 
controversies regarding the storage of private digital information via 
their Cloud-based data services.1 The Cloud refers to internet-based 
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storage systems that, in recent years, have replaced local physical 
devices, such as hard drives, as the primary storage system for anything 
an individual may view, use, store, or save electronically.2 The fight 
between the United States government for Cloud data related to ongoing 
criminal investigations and companies that want to protect the privacy of 
their consumers has become more contentious and more prevalent. 
These companies have been unwilling to turn over their customers’ data 
to government agencies attempting to solve crimes or investigate 
suspects.3 This resistance from tech companies directly challenges the 
government’s broad authority to access this type of data, granted to it 
under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).4 
Several recent cases demonstrate the rising tension between 
government agencies and tech companies. In 2015, an Arkansas man 
hosted a party for his friends where they watched a football game.5 The 
next day one of his party guests was found dead in the backyard.6 Police 
investigating the crime seized the host’s Amazon Echo device. 
Amazon’s Echo constantly records noises in a room and saves any 
communications recorded after an individual uses the Echo’s “wake” 
word to call it into action. It then sends those communications to 
Amazon for storage in the Cloud. Investigators, hoping to find evidence 
implicating the host, repeatedly requested Amazon turn over access to 
                                                     
1. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Devlin 
Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple to Unlock iPhone in New York Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 
2016, 3:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-keep-pushing-apple-to-unlock-iphone-in-new-
york-case-1460128066 [https://perma.cc/7N3P-B5KP] [hereinafter Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing 
Apple]; Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors In Murder 
Investigation, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/ 
12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digital-tracks-amazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation 
[https://perma.cc/95ZM-BJHD]. The government later dropped the iPhone case. Devlin Barrett, 
Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case to Force Apple to Unlock iPhone, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 
2016, 10:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-prosecutors-drop-court-case-to-force-apple-
to-unlock-iphone-1461377642 [https://perma.cc/UM8F-MDK5] [hereinafter Barrett, Federal 
Prosecutors Drop Court Case]. 
2. Joanna Stern, What is the ‘Cloud’?, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://abcnews. 
go.com/Technology/cloud-computing-storage-explained/story?id=16647561 
[https://perma.cc/Z7FD-9WKP].  
3. Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 894; Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1; 
Barrett, Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case, supra note 1; Selyukh, supra note 1.  
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012). 
5. Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1; Selyukh, supra note 1. 
6. Selyukh, supra note 1.  
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the recordings.7 After months of back and forth, Amazon agreed to hand 
over the Alexa data at the beginning of March 2017.8 
In April 2016, Microsoft filed a complaint against the United States 
government alleging the government’s use of ECPA violated the Fourth 
Amendment.9 The Western District of Washington dismissed 
Microsoft’s Fourth Amendment claim on standing grounds.10 Apple has 
also had its own battles with the government regarding customer data. 
The Department of Justice tried to force Apple to unlock an iPhone 
related to a 2015 San Bernardino, California terrorist attack.11 When 
Apple refused to cooperate, the government hired hackers to do the job 
for it.12 In another case, the Department of Justice pursued a court order 
to force Apple to unlock an iPhone seized in relation to a drug 
investigation.13 The government later dropped the case.14 Most recently, 
in November 2017, after a gunman attacked a church in Sutherland 
Springs, Texas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) served Apple 
with another warrant, this time for both the gunman’s iPhone and Cloud 
data.15 Apple has yet to respond to the warrant.16 
                                                     
7. Id. 
8. Id. In response, the company released a statement: “Amazon will not release customer 
information without a valid and binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to 
overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course.” Id. 
9. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 
887 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR). The complaint also alleges the government’s use 
of ECPA is a violation of the First Amendment. Id. 
10. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017) 
(stating that Microsoft did not have standing to bring this issue as a third party under the Fourth 
Amendment, but could bring the claim under the First Amendment). 
11. Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justice-depart 
ment-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RV62-E8MS].  
12. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino 
iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-
paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de 
-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.859eee269aa0 [https://perma.cc/248F-ZN2U]. 
Before that, in September 2014, Apple made it “impossible for the company to turn over data from 
most iPhones or iPads to police—even when they have a search warrant.” Craig Timberg, Apple 
Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2 
-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4e49f7be96f1 
[https://perma.cc/RWS4-TEYS]. 
13. Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1. 
14. Barrett, Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case, supra note 1. 
15. Rob Thubron, Apple Served with Search Warrant to Access Texas Shooter’s iPhone, iCloud 
Account, TECHSPOT (Nov. 19, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://www.techspot.com/news/71947-apple-
served-search-warrant-access-texas-shooter-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/X6GX-4CH9]. 
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These cases all focus on the tension between the appropriate means 
through which consumer data can be accessed and who has a right to 
that information: whether it belongs to the consumer, the tech companies 
storing it, or the United States government. This tension presents 
dynamic challenges absent in previous jurisprudence: while courts have 
long examined technological capacity and privacy, the immense scope of 
data that can now be aggregated and stored in the Cloud is 
unprecedented. The impact of these kinds of cases is far-reaching. 
Amazon had sold more than eight million Echo devices by January of 
2017.17 More than 400 million devices are running Microsoft’s Windows 
10.18 Apple’s iPhones are used by more than 700 million people.19 Most 
importantly, each of these technological services are Cloud-based, which 
means they automatically upload information inputted by consumers into 
the Cloud to be stored.20 The sheer amount of private information stored 
and then uploaded to the Cloud through these devices is massive. 
Courts have attempted to manage the tension between investigative 
agencies requiring access to private data and claims that the Fourth 
Amendment protects such data. But courts, including the Supreme 
Court, lack the tools to adequately engage in the type of technical 
analysis required when dealing with private data aggregation by third 
parties.21 The existing jurisprudence fails to adequately address when the 
government’s examination of information aggregated, disseminated, and 
stored on electronic devices and the Cloud is a constitutional violation of 
a person’s right to privacy.22 The relevant statute, ECPA, also does not 
                                                     
16. Id. 
17. Taylor Soper, More than 8M People Own an Amazon Echo as Customer Awareness Increases 
‘Dramatically,’ GEEKWIRE (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2017/ 
8-million-people-amazon-echo-customer-awareness-increases-dramatically/ [https://perma.cc/W2J 
H-DQSZ]. 
18. Tom Warren, Apple Reveals Windows 10 Is Four Times More Popular Than the Mac, VERGE 
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/4/15176766/apple-microsoft-windows-
10-vs-mac-users-figures-stats [https://perma.cc/JRL3-6FN8]. That does not include the number of 
people who use Microsoft products that do not use Windows 10. Id. 
19. Don Reisinger, Here’s How Many iPhones Are Currently Being Used Worldwide, FORTUNE 
(Mar. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/06/apple-iphone-use-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/UU 
L8-95QG]. 
20. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/P43Z-GAB9]; Russell Brandom, Windows 10 Is 
the End of Cloud-Free Computing, VERGE (Aug. 17, 2015, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2015/8/17/9167203/windows-10-privacy-scare-cloud-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/TJ48-ZUYT]; iCloud for Safekeeping. And Easy Sharing., APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/icloud/ [https://perma.cc/5N3J-PMWJ].  
21. Infra section II.A. 
22. Id. 
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provide adequate guidance.23 The overbroad nature of ECPA and the 
lack of judicial clarity on the issue demands congressional action.24 
When enacted, ECPA’s authors did not foresee the grand 
technological advances used today.25 ECPA was created to deal with 
how the government could access the technology of the time,26 which 
did not include the immense collection and storage of aggregated data 
through the Cloud.27 While much has been written on the reformation of 
ECPA as it applies to the individual, there is little about the relationship 
between tech companies’ capacity to store private information and the 
government’s utilization of the Act to access such information. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has only heard one case regarding the 
government’s search power under ECPA and has yet to issue an 
opinion.28 Therefore, magistrate, district, and circuit court judges have 
been the primary administrators of ECPA. They often come to different 
opinions from each other, particularly regarding the protective strength 
and scope of court orders that determine in what scenarios the 
government can access stored information.29 Congress must enact new 
laws or amend ECPA to adequately reflect the massive technological 
advances of the past thirty years. In the absence of legislative action, 
courts should recognize that digital data and storage is fundamentally 
distinct and demands different analysis than the classic tools used to 
identify whether a government search is constitutional. Justices have 
been reluctant to apply a consistent framework for analyzing searches of 
and by technological data—oscillating between recognizing technology 
as fundamentally distinct from classic surveillance techniques and 
applying the same traditional theories to digital data. The Court should 
consistently recognize data as fundamentally distinct and abandon 
attempts to bring digital searches in line with traditional surveillance 
methods. 
Part I of this Comment reviews ECPA, section I.A explores ECPA’s 
history, and section I.B discusses courts’ application of ECPA. Part II 
                                                     
23. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
24. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012). 
25. Julie J. McMurry, Note, Privacy in the Information Age: The Need for Clarity in the ECPA, 
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 602 (2000). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2018) (No. 16-402) (granting 
certiorari). 
29. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017). See 
generally infra section III.A. 
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examines the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Section II.A focuses on the established framework for courts to analyze 
Fourth Amendment protections afforded to modern data storage and 
technology, and section II.B examines three seminal cases, as well as 
their concurrences, respectively. These cases indicate that the Court 
oscillates between two fundamental principles when dealing with digital 
information: first, that digital data searched by advanced technology is 
distinct from traditional methods of surveillance; and, alternatively, that 
it is simply an extension of traditional methods of surveillances. Part III 
analyzes possible solutions to this challenge. Section III.A analyzes 
ECPA’s current protections and why it falls flat in the face of modern 
technology and aggregated data. Section III.B discusses why the 
judiciary is not the correct branch of government to make specific 
decisions regarding technology searches. This section further argues that 
Congress should amend ECPA or enact new legislation. Finally, section 
III.C argues that, if Congress fails to act, the courts should establish that 
digital data is fundamentally distinct and is due a new type of analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
I. ECPA CREATES AN UNWORKABLE STANDARD AMONG 
COURTS 
Congress first enacted ECPA in 1986.30 ECPA amended Title 18 of 
the U.S. Code, which primarily deals with criminal procedure and 
crimes, including when a search or seizure is valid.31 The portion of the 
Act related to storing and retrieving digital data is also commonly 
referred to the Stored Communications Act (SCA). At the time of 
enactment, the primary purpose of ECPA was to “prevent unauthorized 
government access to private electronic communications”32 even when 
that information was voluntarily provided by an individual to a third 
party. ECPA creates a set of procedures the government must abide by 
when seeking to obtain private consumer information stored by a third 
party, such as Amazon or Microsoft. First, the government can apply for 
a court order to access the content of a consumer’s information and 
communications so long as the information is “relevant” to an ongoing 
                                                     
30. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
31. Id.  
32. What is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act?, MINC: LEGAL RES. CTR., 
https://www.minclaw.com/legal-resource-center/what-is-the-electronic-communications-privacy-
act/ [https://perma.cc/LKB4-3RK5]. 
15 - Aitchison.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:41 PM 
2018] PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 1025 
 
investigation and has been stored by the company for more than 180 
days.33 If the information has been stored by the third party for fewer 
than 180 days, the government must obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause.34 When the government is authorized to access information from 
third-party technology companies—regardless of whether the 
government obtains a court order or warrant—it may also prevent those 
companies from informing customers that their information is being 
searched and monitored by the government.35 Although the government 
may only prevent notice to the subject of the search for ninety days at a 
time, it may request an extension as many times as it wants. This process 
of repeatedly getting court orders to prevent the subjects of searches to 
be notified of the search has become known as “secrecy orders” or 
“indefinite gags.”36 
A. ECPA Has Not Adapted to Modern Technology 
When Congress enacted ECPA in 1986, less than one percent of 
Americans had cell phones,37 let alone cell phones that could store 
significant amounts of personal information and automatically upload 
that information into discreet, electronic storage facilities. Since its 
enactment, ECPA has been amended more than ten times,38 but none of 
these amendments addressed the standards through which the 
government can obtain either content information of private individuals 
or an indefinite gag order. As it currently stands, the Act has been 
criticized39 for failing to protect consumers in a day and age where 
                                                     
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (d). 
34. Id. § 2703(a). 
35. Id. 
36. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 6; Andrew Crocker, New DOJ Policy 
on Gag Orders Is Good, but the Courts Could Have Done Better, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 25, 
2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/new-doj-policy-gag-orders-good-courts-could-have-
done-better [https://perma.cc/49VY-48KX]. 
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 16-402); CTIA, BACKGROUND ON CTIA’S WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY 2 (2015), 
https://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ctia_survey_ye_2014_graph 
ics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJL9-82JB]. 
38. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004). 
39. In response to ECPA, activist groups have popped up dedicated to the reformation of the Act 
in light of the developing technology. Digital4th is one such group. The organization describes its 
problem with ECPA in the digital world on its homepage: “[w]hen it passed in 1986, ECPA was 
intended to extend Fourth Amendment protections to online communications. However, this was 
long before most Americans had access to a home computer, before email was widely used, and 
before the invention of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms.” A Summary of the 
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sharing information is highly dependent on electronic communications. 
Although technology has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, 
ECPA has remained “virtually the same.”40 For example, ECPA 
provides stronger protections for content information (the body of the 
email) rather than non-content information (the subject line of the email) 
by creating different standards through which a magistrate may approve 
a court order to search the information.41 But, ECPA does not 
differentiate between search implications for Cloud-based services and 
more traditional web-based services, even though the amount and type 
of data stored in each can be drastically different.42 Because the Cloud 
provides an expansive online storage system for users, the government 
can now quickly and easily access information that would have 
traditionally been stored on a local hard-drive or in a desk drawer; 
information that would not be automatically shared with a third party. 
Therefore, under ECPA the government has broad power to access and 
seize information commonly stored online, such as emails or 
documents.43 The immense information that can be stored on the Cloud 
and the potential to chip away at individuals’ privacy calls for greater 
protections than are currently provided. 
Before ECPA, federal wiretap and privacy standards only protected 
wire and oral communications.44 Through ECPA, Congress sought to 
expand protections to cover stored electronic communication, such as 
emails, even when they were provided to a third party voluntarily.45 
Under ECPA, the government can require a company to turn over vast 
                                                     
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), DIGITAL4TH, https://digital4th.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/A5SM-7EPS]. 
40. Id. 
41. The distinction between content data and non-content data is at the crux of Fourth 
Amendment search jurisprudence. See generally Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). The classic example distinguishing the two is a 
mailed letter: the information inside the letter is considered content and, therefore, provided greater 
Fourth Amendment protections; the information on the outside of the letter, such as the name and 
addresses of the correspondents, is considered non-content information. United States v. Forrester, 
512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (expanding the logic behind letter information to distinguish 
between IP addresses (content) and URLs (non-content)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 et seq. (2012) (establishing the standard for obtaining content information). 
42. A Summary of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 39. This was 
also at the crux of Microsoft’s complaint. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9. 
43. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; A Summary of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 39. 
44. Katherine A. Oyama, Note, E-mail Privacy After United States v. Councilman: Legislative 
Options for Amendment ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499, 504 (2006). 
45. Id. 
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amounts of information regarding any number of customers46 as well as 
prohibit the company from telling customers their data is being shared 
with investigators.47 Under the statute, the court issuing the order must 
allow the gag order if there is “reason to believe” the notification of a 
warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in “(1) endangering the life 
or physical safety of an individual; (2) flight from prosecution; (3) 
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (4) intimidation of potential 
witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or 
unduly delaying a trial.”48 Every ninety days, a court may issue a new 
gag order as long as one of the criteria is met.49 
A recent case involving Microsoft directly addresses the tension 
between ECPA as written and indefinite gag orders as applied to Cloud 
data. Microsoft alleged section 2705(b), which creates the indefinite gag 
order option, is unconstitutional because “[p]eople do not give up their 
rights when they move their private information from physical storage to 
the cloud.”50 When ECPA was written, Congress did not adequately 
consider the type of technology prevalent today and the changes made to 
                                                     
46. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705 et seq. (2012) (lacking clear 
limitations to the governments subpoena power). 
47. Id. § 2705(b). 
48. Id. 
49. Id.  
50. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 2. The complaint also provides an 
excellent overview of why the transition from local hardware to Cloud storage implicates the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Before the digital age, individuals and businesses stored their most sensitive correspondence 
and other documents in file cabinets and desk drawers. As computers become prevalent, users 
moved their materials to local computers and on-premises servers, which continued to remain 
within the user’s physical possession and control. In both eras, the government had to give 
notice when it sought private information and communications, except in the rarest of 
circumstances. 
Cloud computing has spurred another profound change in the storage of private information. 
Today, individuals increasingly keep their emails and documents on remove servers owned by 
third parties, i.e., in the cloud, using free web-based services . . . . Businesses have also 
migrated their information technology infrastructure to servers hosted by providers . . . which 
offer productivity software . . . and the ability to access correspondence and other documents 
from any device. But the transition to the cloud does not alter the fundamental constitutional 
requirement that the government must—with few exceptions—give notice when it searches 
and seizes the private information or communications of individuals or businesses.  
The government, however, has exploited the transition to cloud computing as a means of 
expanding its power to conduct secret investigations. As individuals and business have moved 
their most sensitive information to the cloud, the government has increasingly adopted the 
tactic of obtaining the private digital documents of cloud customers not from the customers 
themselves, but through legal process directed at online cloud providers like Microsoft.  
Id. 
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the statute throughout the years have failed to address advances in 
technology.51 
Despite these shortcomings, some jurisdictions have considered the 
issue and many have identified that the implication of new technology, 
particularly storage of data in the Cloud, warrants stronger protection 
than provided under ECPA. At least fifteen states have enacted 
legislation aimed at more strongly protecting digital information than the 
federal ECPA.52 California, in particular, enacted comprehensive 
legislation that requires all law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant 
before accessing content information of consumers, including location 
information.53 In contrast, the federal government recently passed a bill 
that would allow federal law enforcement agencies to circumvent ECPA 
and the Fourth Amendment in accessing consumer data.54 While the 
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act does not 
explicitly amend ECPA, it allows foreign governments to access 
consumer information from technology companies without a warrant.55 
The United States government can then retrieve that data from the 
foreign government as it sees fit.56 The tension between tech companies 
and the government on the federal and state level indicates that ECPA, 
as is, is an inadequate tool for courts analyzing protections under the 
Fourth Amendment.57 Additionally, the movement of the states toward 
providing stronger protections similarly shows ECPA’s failure to protect 
the privacy of individuals.58 
                                                     
51. Id.; Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails 
Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2008). 
52. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 
2015, 9:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z5TE-PM5H].  
53. Id. 
54. Tom Krazit, President Trump Signs Omnibus Spending Bill Putting the CLOUD Act on the 
Books in Big Shift for Cloud Data, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.geekwire.com/2018/president-trump-signs-omnibus-spending-bill-putting-cloud-act-
books-big-shift-cloud-data/ [https://perma.cc/3PR5-VWTC]. 
55. Tom Krazit, As Congress Considers the Tech-Backed CLOUD Act, Privacy and Human 
Rights Groups Raise Concerns, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 18, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/ 
2018/congress-considers-tech-backed-cloud-act-privacy-human-rights-groups-raise-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/MNB3-U7V4]. 
56. Id. 
57. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 
16-402), 2017 WL 3575179, at *21 (“In assessing whether an expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable, norms and expectation shaped by federal and state statutes are relevant considerations.” 
(citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion))). 
58. Zetter, supra note 52. 
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B. Confusion and Inconsistent Outcomes: ECPA’s Section 2705(b) 
Delayed Notification Requirement 
Wide divergence in the interpretation by lower courts of one of 
ECPA’s main provisions for the government’s authorization to collect 
information exemplifies the confusing standards and inconsistent 
application among lower courts. Many legal scholars have written about 
effective ways to amend ECPA.59 Currently, the Supreme Court is 
considering a case, Carpenter v. United States,60 examining the validity 
of the government’s acquisition of significant amounts of non-content 
information based on ECPA section 2703, which sets standards for when 
government entities may access information stored by a remote 
computing service.61 By enacting section 2703(b), Congress explicitly 
intended to prevent the government from engaging in unregulated 
“fishing expeditions.”62 Despite scrutiny from academics and the 
nation’s highest court, one provision of ECPA has been largely ignored 
in the discourse, even though litigation surrounding it has become more 
prevalent: section 2705(b)—the indefinite gag order exception. Courts 
throughout the country have imposed significantly different outcomes 
when it comes to the length of time customers can remain in the dark 
about whether their information is being searched. 
Courts’ inconsistent application of the indefinite gag order exception 
under the Fourth Amendment demonstrates the unworkability of ECPA. 
Under ECPA section 2703(a), the government can require companies to 
refrain from informing their customers that the government is obtaining 
their information when it uses a search warrant.63 But, ECPA 
                                                     
59. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 23 (providing a detailed recommendation for changing ECPA to 
adequately address changing technology). 
60. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-402). 
61. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 
293 (2017) (No. 16-402). 
62. Brief for Respondent at 31, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 
16-402), 2017 WL 4311113, at *53 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 827, pt. 1, at 31 (1994)). 
63. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity 
may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications 
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, 
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A governmental entity 
may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under 
subsection (b) of this section.”). 
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section 2703(b) does require disclosure to consumers when the 
government obtains an administrative court order to access their content-
based information.64 However, section 2705 creates a delayed notice 
loophole that allows the government to continue obtaining information 
on consumers indefinitely without notifying them, as long as the 
government gets a new court order every ninety days.65 These extended 
section 2705(b) orders have become known as secrecy, or indefinite, gag 
orders. In October of 2017, the Department of Justice imposed the first 
limitation on the use of indefinite gag orders by implementing a one-
year limit on the use of indefinite gag orders by federal agents.66 
However, the newly implemented policy can be revoked at any time.67 
The recent changes to the government policies surrounding the use of 
indefinite gag orders do not resolve the larger issue at hand: the 
application of indefinite gag orders across jurisdictions results in 
different outcomes. The Microsoft case specifically focused on this 
issue, claiming that ECPA’s indefinite gag order provision was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.68 In its complaint, 
Microsoft alleged that more than 3,250 secrecy orders were ordered 
against the company in fewer than two years.69 The Fourth Amendment 
claim was ultimately dismissed on a standing issue, but the case still 
sheds light on the concerns over ECPA. The Western District of 
                                                     
64. Id. § 2703(b) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to 
disclose the contents of any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made 
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection—(A) without required notice to the subscriber or 
customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant 
procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (B) with prior notice from the governmental 
entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity—(i) uses an administrative subpoena 
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or 
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; except that delayed 
notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.” (emphasis added)). 
65. Id. § 2705(a)(4) (“Extensions of the delay of notification provided in section 2703 of up to 
ninety days each may be granted by the court upon application, or by certification by a 
governmental entity, but only in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.”). 
66. Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department 
Law Enforcement Components; Department Litigating Components; the Director, Executive Office 
for U.S. Attorneys; & all United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.document 
cloud.org/documents/4116081-Policy-Regarding-Applications-for-Protective.html 
[https://perma.cc/3QWB-AJ2H] [hereinafter DOJ Memo]. 
67. Crocker, supra note 36. 
68. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017); supra 
notes 9–10 and accompanying text. Microsoft prevailed on its First Amendment claim when the 
Court held the use of indefinite gag orders was a limitation on the company’s speech. Id. 
69. Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 896. 
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Washington Court maintained that Microsoft could not bring this case as 
a third party but indicated that ECPA searches were questionable in light 
of the Fourth Amendment. The judge opined, “[a]s Microsoft alleges, 
the indefinite nondisclosure orders allowed under Section 2705(b) mean 
that some customers may never know that the government has obtained 
information in which those customers have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”70 The opinion went on to state that some of Microsoft’s 
customers will be unable to vindicate their own Fourth Amendment 
rights.71 
In contrast to the Microsoft case, federal courts in California have 
twice recently determined that a finite period for gag orders is a 
commonsense application of ECPA.72 In an order examining the validity 
of a warrant issued through ECPA, a magistrate judge held that the 
application of indefinite gag orders were unconstitutional in that they 
raised First Amendment concerns.73 In that case, the court distinguished 
between prior cases where a gag order would expire after ninety days so 
long as the government did not request an extension and when the 
government asks for a gag order until further notice.74 The court stated 
that the requirement of expiration was vital and without it, indefinite gag 
orders were unconstitutional.75 
In a second recent case, a federal court from the Central District of 
California determined that ECPA’s indefinite gag order violated Adobe 
Systems Incorporated’s (Adobe) First Amendment rights.76 The court 
discussed the lack of controlling precedent for dealing with ECPA’s 
indefinite gag orders77 and its inconsistent application across courts,78 a 
sentiment echoed in this Comment. The opinion went on to examine the 
Microsoft case, as well as other cases from other jurisdictions where an 
indefinite gag order was considered constitutional.79 
                                                     
70. Id. at 916. 
71. Id. at 915. 
72. In re Grand Jury Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1091 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015); In re Search Warrant for [Redacted]@hotmail.com, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1184 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014). 
73. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
74. Id. at 1093. 
75. Id.  
76. In re Search Warrant, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 
77. Id. at 978 (“The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether Section 2705(b) allows for indefinite 
NPOs, and authority on the question is scarce.”).  
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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The courts in these cases illustrate the privacy concerns implicated in 
the power ECPA provides the government. In In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 80 the court said, 
[W]ere the court to grant the government’s request [for an 
indefinite gag order], Yahoo! would be prohibited from ever 
sharing the existence of the subpoena with anyone—even years 
after the grand jury moved on to other things. In an era of 
increasing public demand for transparency about the extent of 
government demands for data from providers like Yahoo!, this 
cannot stand.81 
Courts have largely deferred to Congress when dealing with statutory 
protections in the privacy realm, and ECPA is no exception.82 Congress 
has left those protections untouched in recent years resulting in different 
courts doing different things with practically the same set of facts. With 
the increased litigation surrounding ECPA and Cloud data, Congress 
should act and create necessary changes to ECPA that can guide courts 
as they analyze the government’s ability to access consumer 
information.83 One reason why courts have inconsistently applied the 
statute is because the relevant jurisprudence is not particularly 
instructive. 
C. Courts’ ECPA Jurisprudence Is Inconsistent and Largely 
Unhelpful 
Other judicial interpretations of ECPA provide little guidance for 
dealing with the types of issues relevant in the Microsoft case, and other 
government requests for data stored in the Cloud. Most federal court 
decisions surrounding ECPA deal with private communications provided 
first to a third-party employer, and then to the government. The 
relationship between employer and employee creates a situation that is 
utterly distinct from one in which the third party has no relationship—
                                                     
80. 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
81. Id. at 1094–95. 
82. Oza, supra note 51, at 1054–55.  
Because Congress is in a better position than the courts to conduct fact-finding inquiries, 
courts, in deference to Congress, will typically avoid unnecessary determinations of 
constitutional questions where Congress has drafted an expansive statutory scheme regulating 
some aspect of constitutional rights. The ECPA is one such statutory scheme, and therefore, 
courts are often deferential to Congress in determining Fourth Amendment protection for 
electronic communications. 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
83. Infra section III.A. 
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other than as a storage facility for information—with the individual who 
is the subject of the search. 
There are only three cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly 
incorporated ECPA into its analysis. Most recently, in City of Ontario v. 
Quon,84 the Court determined that city officials could access a police 
officer’s text communications under ECPA.85 The Court’s analysis of 
the validity of ECPA rested on distinguishing between the role of the 
government as an employer, and the role of the government as a 
prosecutor and investigator of crimes.86 Because the Court identified the 
government actor as an employer, rather than its more traditional role as 
government entity investigating crimes, the Court granted the 
government more leeway to access the employee’s information under 
ECPA.87 The Court’s analysis renders this case unhelpful when applying 
it to the realm of personal information stored in a Cloud and managed by 
third parties. 
In a case a few years prior, Doe v. Chao,88 Doe claimed the 
government violated his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
when the Department of Labor used his social security number to verify 
his request for benefits under the Black Lung Act.89 Doe raised ECPA as 
a last resort to get damages when the Privacy Act he originally sued 
under, which regulated the government’s storage of individual’s records, 
did not allow for damages.90 Doe attempted to compare the legislative 
history of ECPA, which does allow damages, and the Privacy Act to 
show that he could receive damages.91 The Court was unconvinced by 
his attempts to draw comparisons between the statute at issue and 
ECPA.92 The Court said that it was particularly unmoved by a legislative 
interpretation that looks beyond the text, history, and relevant case law; 
particularly when the records act was enacted after ECPA.93 This 
analysis has dissuaded lower courts from using analogous legislation 
when identifying legislative purpose. 
                                                     
84. 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
85. Id. at 746–47. 
86. Id. 
87. Id.  
88. 540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
89. Id. at 614.  
90. Id. at 626–27. 
91. Id. at 626. ECPA’s legislative history indicates a plaintiff could receive minimum damages 
without proving real damages, while the Privacy Act at issue in this case does not. Id. at 627. 
92. Id. at 626–27.  
93. Id. 
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The Court’s other ECPA case—the 2001 case Bartnicki v. Vopper94—
does not provide much guidance either.95 In Bartnicki, the Court 
considered the validity of government use of information that had been 
illegally intercepted and then broadcast to the public.96 However, the 
Court focused on whether the radio broadcast of illegally obtained 
information was a violation of the First Amendment, and did not 
substantially address the Fourth Amendment implications.97 The relevant 
analysis of ECPA is inapplicable to the current state of electronic 
communication, access, and storage affairs because in Bartnicki, the 
issue revolved around a non-governmental person98 accessing 
information and what was then done with that information.99 There was 
no discussion of the role of governmental officials, who may have been 
able to legally obtain the information under ECPA, if they had properly 
requested it.100 The government did not intercept the information at all, 
making the case wholly irrelevant to this Comment’s analysis.101 There 
was also no discussion of the initial acquisition of the information—the 
Court focused on what that electronically stored information was used 
for later.102 Therefore, none of the Court’s ECPA cases are illustrative 
for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis and third parties who are 
not employers. 
While the Supreme Court has yet to examine the validity of ECPA,103 
several of the circuit courts have. Most are employment cases that are 
irrelevant to the unique consumer-business relationships at issue in this 
Comment. United States v. Councilman,104 Garcia v. City of Laredo,105 
                                                     
94. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 514. During contract negotiations between a union and their employer, part of a 
conversation was recorded and then played on the radio the next day. The union contended the 
recording was obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act, which is related to ECPA, and therefore, it 
was illegal to play it on the radio. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. It was unknown who intercepted the communication and leaked it to the radio reporter (or 
whether the radio reporter was the one who accessed the communication in the first place). Id. at 
514–15. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Pending the Court’s forthcoming opinion in Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S. 
Ct. 2211 (2018) (No. 16-402). 
104. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
105. 702 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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Theofel v. Farey-Jones,106 and United States v. Warshak107 are all 
seminal cases examining ECPA outside the employment context. 
However, the courts decided Councilman and Theofel prior to 2008, 
before Cloud computing technology was widespread.108 In Councilman, 
the First Circuit held that an Internet Service Provider (ISP) could 
conduct real-time surveillance of its customers’ email exchanges when 
the communication was intercepted while transferring between storage 
locations.109 The Fifth Circuit in Garcia determined that ECPA did not 
apply to information stored on a personal cell phone.110 
In Theofel, the Ninth Circuit focused on ECPA’s cause of action.111 
Although the case directly addressed the relevant issues and tension 
between government acquisition of information and third-party storage, 
it did not create enduring precedent. In Theofel, the government obtained 
“‘[a]ll copies of e-mails sent or received by anyone’ at [the company], 
with no limitation as to time or scope” after being granted an overbroad 
warrant.112 The court made a broad ruling that created different warrant 
requirements for unopened emails and unopened emails that had 
“expired in the normal course.”113 Since the Theofel decision, lower 
courts in the Ninth Circuit have struggled to understand the distinction 
between unopened emails and unopened emails that are expired.114 Other 
circuit courts have explicitly rejected that analysis as overbroad and 
unworkable.115 
Most notably, in United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit explicitly 
recognized that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the content of their email messages held by their third-party ISP.116 The 
court held that a government agency could not compel email messages 
from a third party without a warrant.117 Warshak was brought to court 
                                                     
106. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
107. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
108. For example, Apple did not launch its customer cloud until 2011. Ross Rubin, Switched On: 
Apple’s Cloud Conundrum, ENGADGET (June 12, 2011), https://www.engadget.com/2011/06/12/ 
switched-on-apples-cloud-conundrum/ [https://perma.cc/FC83-R627].  
109. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 67. 
110. Garcia, 702 F.3d at 790 (declining to extend the determinations made by the First Circuit in 
United States v. Councilman).  
111. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072 (referring to ECPA by its other name, the SCA). 
112. Id. at 1071. 
113. Id. at 1076. 
114. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214. 
115. United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009). 
116. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010). 
117. Id. at 286. 
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for conning people into purchasing herbal supplements, which 
promised—but failed to—significantly increase penis size.118 During its 
investigation, law enforcement officers seized about 27,000 of 
Warshak’s private emails from his ISP after obtaining a court order, but 
not a warrant, under ECPA.119 The Sixth Circuit held that even though 
ECPA technically allowed for the acquisition of tens of thousands of 
emails with a court order, it was still a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.120 In its analysis, the court recognized that digital data is 
fundamentally distinct from traditional means of communication and 
information storage: “[i]n short, ‘account’ is an apt word for the 
conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as 
it provides an account of its owner’s life. By obtaining access to 
someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer deeply into 
his activities.”121 The court ultimately determined that, because of the 
government agents’ good-faith belief that they did not need a warrant to 
access the content of Warshak’s emails held by his ISP, the emails 
would not be excluded from the trial even though they were improperly 
gathered under ECPA.122 However, the court’s departure from the 
standard application of ECPA and the recognition of the strain between 
the statute and the Fourth Amendment makes the case particularly 
noteworthy, even when the court ultimately allowed the emails. 
Together, these four cases showcase the variance in court decisions 
when interpreting ECPA and the inconsistency across jurisdictions. 
Other circuits have also taken up the issue, but never when the 
government was trying to access information about individuals, making 
the analysis distinct from cases where ECPA is used to obtain 
information in the Cloud.123 In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co.,124 the Third Circuit held that a company’s interception of an 
employee’s email account to prove his disloyalty and consequently fire 
him was not a violation of ECPA.125 In Hall v. Earthlink Network, 
                                                     
118. Id. at 277. 
119. Id. at 283. 
120. Id. at 274. 
121. Id. at 284. 
122. Id. at 274. 
123. See, e.g., Expert Bus. Sys., LLC v. BI4CE, Inc., No. 06-1265, 2007 WL 1381595, at *2 (4th 
Cir. May 9, 2007) (holding that ECPA was not violated when someone forwarded the emails to a 
third party because there was no government interception). 
124. 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). 
125. Id. at 109–11. 
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Inc.,126 the Second Circuit summarily dismissed a case in favor of the 
ISP in which a plaintiff claimed the ISP intercepted his email and 
identified him as a spammer.127 Because these cases deal primarily with 
the employee-employer relationship or relationships solely between 
private individuals, they fail to provide meaningful ECPA analysis for 
courts to apply when examining searches of Cloud data. 
Guest v. Leis128 is more illustrative of how the government acquires 
private information under ECPA. While most of the circuit court 
opinions regarding ECPA fail to address the relationship between private 
information and government seizure, in Leis, the Sixth Circuit held that 
information meant for public posting was not subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.129 Specifically, an online bulletin board system 
was seized as part of an obscenity investigation.130 Users of the bulletin 
board brought a claim against investigators under ECPA, alleging that 
the investigation into the posts was a violation of a citizen’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.131 The court determined that, because the users 
were planning to post their information to the public, they were not 
afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment.132 Leis is particularly 
relevant to the issues at hand because of the court’s explicit Fourth 
Amendment analysis and the government actors’ seizure of the 
information of private officials.133 However, the case is distinguishable 
from ECPA Cloud cases because the information the government 
officials seized was explicitly for public use, whereas the cases relating 
to tech companies, such as Microsoft, involve the search and seizure of 
information that is not explicitly intended for public posting.134 The 
circuit court cases illustrate the many kinds of ECPA analyses courts can 
engage in and establish that whether the party seeking the information is 
a private person or a government actor is a threshold question for ECPA 
analysis.135 
                                                     
126. 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005). 
127. Id. at 508. 
128. 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
129. Id. at 326.  
130. Id. at 330. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 333. 
133. Id. at 334.  
134. Id. at 333. 
135. Supra section I.B.  
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE FULL GAMUT 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PRIVACY ISSUES 
To understand the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and 
the Cloud, it is vital to understand the rights afforded to individuals 
under the Fourth Amendment and the breadth of power the government 
has in accessing private information from tech companies under ECPA. 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”136 The Supreme Court has parsed this language 
into multiple tests. First, the government is conducting a “search” if they 
are seeking information that can only be found by penetrating an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.137 Second, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable absent a few specific exceptions.138 
Third, to analyze constitutional searches, courts have consistently 
examined the methods through which information was acquired, not 
necessarily the subject matter of the information.139 Finally, courts apply 
different analyses when examining whether an individual’s property has 
been seized under the Fourth Amendment.140 
To understand how the Fourth Amendment interacts with ECPA and 
the subsequent impact on obtaining digital data, it is important to 
understand the Court’s extensive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
ECPA was meant to create clear digital protections under the Fourth 
Amendment when dealing with digital data141 and was guided by 
foundational Fourth Amendment principles: examining how, not what, 
data is collected by the government, and whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data.142 In conducting this 
analysis, the Court has echoed ECPA’s creators in its desire to avoid 
“dragnet-type law enforcement practices.”143 
                                                     
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
137. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). While the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test came originally from Justice Harlan’s concurrence, it quickly 
became controlling law. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). 
138. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (the defendant in Katz took and placed illegal bets over the phone 
while investigators listened in. Justice Harlan suggested the defendant had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy within the phone booth). 
139. Id. at 361–62. 
140. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400–01 (2012). 
141. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1209–19. 
142. Id. 
143. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); see also supra section I.A. 
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A. Early Cases in Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Created 
Vital Doctrines for ECPA Analysis 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court revamped its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, introducing new ideas and doctrines that 
have become integral to Fourth Amendment analysis in both the 
traditional and technological realm. In his concurrence to the 1967 
decision in Katz v. United States,144 Justice Harlan created the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.145 This standard examines 
whether an individual has an intent to manifest information as private, 
and whether society deems that expectation of privacy reasonable.146 For 
example, society finds it much more reasonable that a person manifest 
an intent for privacy in a conversation within their home compared to on 
a public street. In Katz, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places, from unreasonable search and seizure.147 
Therefore, for the government to obtain information on an individual 
without obtaining a search warrant, the government must do so in a way 
that does not violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.148 
In United States v. Miller,149 the Supreme Court developed a second 
key factor in Fourth Amendment doctrine: the third party doctrine.150 
The third party doctrine mandates that once a person voluntarily 
provides information to a third party, that person no longer has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of that 
information.151 Importantly, ECPA has been described as “a 
                                                     
144. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
145. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).  
148. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
149. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
150. Id. at 443. The defendant was convicted of multiple federal offenses and argued that checks 
and other documents he had sent to banks were improperly admitted as evidence against him 
because he had an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court said the 
action was not improper under the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine. Id. By providing the 
checks and documents to banks, he no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
documents. Id. 
151. Id.; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971) (concealed radio transmitter 
on an informant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293, 294 (1966) (using an individual’s statements he made with a government informer, even in 
private, did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 427–30 
(1963) (federal agent entering the defendant’s office with consent while carrying a recording device 
was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
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Congressional attempt at applying third party doctrine to electronic 
communications in storage with third parties.”152 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has established important 
limitations, such as requiring warrants, or the use of court orders to 
authorize searches, including those issued under section 2703(b) and 
extended under section 2705(b).153 These warrant limitations are meant 
to ensure that magistrate judges act as more than just a rubber stamp and 
limit the ability of police to conduct ad hoc and questionable searches. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a subpoena or warrant for government 
officials to conduct a search must be “sufficiently limited in scope, 
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not 
be unreasonably burdensome.”154 This court order requirement is also 
echoed in the language and application of ECPA.155 
B. The Supreme Court Gives New Technology Varied Considerations 
Under the Fourth Amendment 
Two seminal cases, United States v. Karo156 and United States v. 
Knotts,157 first established the traditional analysis for technology and the 
Fourth Amendment. Both cases dealt with whether the police could, 
without a warrant, attach a beeper to track the location of cans of 
chloroform158 and ether,159 respectively. In both cases, the Court drew a 
clear line regarding the application of Fourth Amendment principles to 
new technology: if visual surveillance would have provided the same 
information as high-tech surveillance, the new technology was not 
subject to new or different Fourth Amendment analysis.160 Although the 
cans were each tracked for multiple days, in Knotts the Supreme Court 
found no search implicating the Fourth Amendment because the can was 
only tracked in public locations where there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and where the police, hypothetically, could have 
                                                     
152. Oza, supra note 51, at 1054; see also infra section II.A.  
153. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). 
154. Id. (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)). 
155. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). However, under ECPA, 
law enforcement agents may also receive a non-warrant court order to access third-party consumer 
information. Id. 
156. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
157. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
158. Id. at 277. 
159. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. 
160. Id. at 721; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
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tracked the individual with the naked eye.161 In contrast, in Karo, the 
Court found there was a search.162 In that case, the beeper tracked the 
can—and, therefore, the individual—to specific rooms inside a home.163 
Because the police would not have been able to gather that information 
through traditional surveillance methods, the court found the collection 
of that information violated an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.164 
Since Karo and Knotts, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has expanded and modernized. Not only has the Court 
increasingly considered technological advances, but it has also 
considered the amount of information that modern devices have the 
capacity to collect—a clear departure from the analysis used in Knotts 
and Karo. In 2001, the Court first acknowledged the important 
relationship between technological advances and privacy protections.165 
In Kyllo v. United States,166 the Court held a police department violated 
the Fourth Amendment when it used heat-sensing technology to see the 
contents of a home.167 The Court reasoned that when the government 
used technology that significantly enhanced the ability of police to 
search a home without notice to the individuals inside, it violated the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.168 The type of technology and 
specific issues in Kyllo are distinct from the constitutional implications 
of Cloud-based storage. However, the case is instructive in its 
consideration of advancing technology in the realm of the Fourth 
Amendment because the Court gave deference to the power of 
technology: “[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are 
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy.”169 Furthermore, in Kyllo, the dissent discussed the importance 
of assuring individuals that advanced technology would not erode the 
Fourth Amendment protections first considered by the Founders.170 
                                                     
161. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
162. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–16. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
166. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
167. Id. at 34. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 28. 
170. Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) 
(stating that the expansion of Fourth Amendment protections through the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test was unnecessary because the fundamental protection against governmental trespass had 
been violated). 
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The decision from Kyllo directs lower courts to engage in a 
technological analysis when considering Fourth Amendment 
protections.171 During oral argument, Justice Stevens acknowledged the 
Court was hesitant to create precedent that would anticipate issues with 
future technological advances.172 Additionally, in the opinion, majority-
writer Justice Scalia recognized the inadequacy of using history to 
analogize to the modern use of technology when he held, “[i]t would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”173 
United States v. Jones174 and Riley v. California175 are two important, 
modern cases for analysis of ECPA. In both cases, the Justices were 
divided on how to reconcile technological advances and traditional 
Fourth Amendment doctrines.176 The collection of aggregate information 
was a major issue in both cases.177 Noted Fourth Amendment legal 
scholar Orin Kerr has dubbed this type of data collection Mosaic 
Theory.178 Mosaic Theory is the idea that modern data collection 
involves the use of a significant number of data points to paint a detailed 
                                                     
171. Kyllo, 468 U.S. at 46. 
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-508), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2000/99-8508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/THA4-9CV8]. When the appellant’s lawyer suggested the Court should rule on 
what technology is capable of, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded, “I don’t think you’re correct in 
that. I think in a Fourth Amendment case we decide what was actually done, not what something is 
capable of.” Id. 
173. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34. 
174. 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (the government suspected a man of running a drug ring and attached a 
GPS tracking device to the bottom of his wife’s car, after its warrant authorization had expired, for 
four weeks to track him). 
175. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
176. In Jones the Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment was violated. However, 
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito each wrote a concurrence hinging on the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test; Justice Alito’s concurrence was joined by three other justices. Jones, 565 U.S. at 
400 (majority opinion); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). In 
Riley, the Court unanimously determined that the search of an individual’s cell phone contents 
incident to arrest was an unconstitutional search. Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2484–85. 
177. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91. Furthermore, in 
November 2017, during the oral argument in Carpenter v. United States, many of the questions 
posed by the Court seemed to reflect continued skepticism of immense data aggregation. For 
example, Justice Sotomayor went as far as to ask the government’s attorney, “[h]ow would – would 
you like to lose?” Supra note 61, at 66.  
178. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311 
(2012). 
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picture of an individual’s life that would otherwise be protected in the 
traditional application and spirit of the Fourth Amendment.179 
Riley consolidated two cases in which officers searched the cell 
phones of suspects without warrants and found information that 
ultimately led to each suspect being charged with serious crimes.180 The 
Supreme Court held the warrantless search of cell phones was 
unconstitutional even under the relevant exceptions, such as search 
incident to arrest.181 Departing from traditional Fourth Amendment 
application, the opinion relied heavily on the technological advances and 
immense data aggregated in cell phones.182 The Court held, “[b]efore 
cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and 
generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy. But cell phones 
can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of 
videos. This has several interrelated privacy consequences.”183 The 
Court recognized that cell phones today are vastly different from other 
effects, those that would have been constitutional to search incident to 
arrest in earlier days (e.g., a pocket book someone was carrying at the 
time of arrest).184 This is particularly true when the ability of cell phones 
to upload information into remote storage facilities makes them 
fundamentally different from traditional personal storage devices.185 
Two years before Riley, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity 
to explicitly analyze the government’s collection of aggregate 
information using unprecedented technological advances in United 
States v. Jones. Jones dealt with a government actor who followed a 
suspect by attaching a device to the suspect’s car and analyzing the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) data.186 The Court’s analysis hinged 
on an entirely distinct type of Fourth Amendment analysis separate from 
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard.187 The majority did not 
engage in any reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, and instead 
determined the government acted unlawfully because attaching the GPS 
to the car was considered a trespassory search of property under the 
                                                     
179. Id. at 313. 
180. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–82.  
181. Id. at 2493. However, other warrant excepts may still apply. Id. at 2494. 
182. Id. at 2489–91.  
183. Id. at 2478. 
184. Id. at 2490. 
185. Id. at 2491. 
186. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012). 
187. See id. at 406–08 (relying on the Fourth Amendment trespass analysis, rather than 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis). 
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Fourth Amendment.188 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia implied 
that when drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Founders had the 
capacity to address future scenarios that are based on rapid technological 
advancement.189 This assertion directly contradicts Scalia’s position in 
Kyllo.190 The Court recognized that without the physical seizure, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test would not have protected Jones, 
because it would have been acceptable for a police car to physically 
follow him around.191 In rejecting the necessity of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis, Justice Scalia did not consider advanced 
technology and instead compared the ability of a GPS device and data 
storage to that of an old-fashioned stakeout.192 He refused to identify that 
the physical collection of data, traditionally done with the naked eye, 
and the electronic collection of aggregate data, using advanced 
technology, have different implications under the Fourth Amendment.193 
The majority opined, 
There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search 
has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being 
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains 
unexplained why a 4-week investigation is “surely” too long and 
why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts 
of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which 
may permit longer observation . . . . We may have to grapple 
with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a 
classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had 
                                                     
188. Id. at 404–05. 
189. See id. at 410–11 (“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable 
searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it 
was adopted.” (emphasis in original)). 
190. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
191. Jones, 565 U.S. at 412.  
192. Id. at 411–12. Of this analysis and the concurrences’ disdain of it, Scalia wrote:  
The concurrence faults our approach for “present[ing] particularly vexing problems” in cases 
that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the transmission of electronic 
signals. We entirely fail to understand that point . . . even assuming, that the concurrence is 
correct to say that ‘traditional surveillance’ of Jones for a 4-week period “would have required 
a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” our cases suggest that 
such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same result 
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.  
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
193. Id.; cf. id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of recognizing 
technological advances in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
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to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to 
resolve them here.194 
These seminal cases show the Supreme Court’s inconsistency when 
considering the implications of the Fourth Amendment on new 
technology. The Court oscillates between acknowledging that the ease, 
convenience, and discreteness of collecting an aggregate amount of data, 
such as that in the Cloud, requires a different kind of analysis, and 
attempting to square traditional doctrines with new surveillance 
techniques. 
C. The Jones Concurrences Show Skepticism When Applying the 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard and Third Party 
Doctrine Standard to Modern Technology 
Although the Jones majority did not engage in a reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis, both concurrences did and their 
reasoning shows a Court without a clear of idea of where to go next. In 
Jones, the two concurrences written by Justice Alito and Justice 
Sotomayor applied a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and 
third party doctrine analysis to the attachment of the GPS device.195 
Furthermore, both Justices Alito and Sotomayor expressed concern over 
whether the Fourth Amendment doctrines provided adequate protection 
of digital data.196 Both concurrences determined that collecting large 
amounts of information by attaching a GPS device to a person’s car was 
an unconstitutional search.197 Further, they determined it may have been 
a violation of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even 
when the car was in a public place where an individual would not 
traditionally have a reasonable expectation of privacy.198 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three members of the Court, 
stated that the warrantless aggregate collection of data was 
unconstitutional.199 But he did not explicitly address the boundaries of 
                                                     
194. Id. at 412–13. 
195. Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
196. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
197. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
198. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); cf. United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (finding that an individual did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when traveling on public roads). 
199. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). In considering technological advances and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Alito said it “rests on the assumption that this 
hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But 
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in 
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collecting aggregate information. Rather, he determined that because the 
issue in Jones was clearly past that line, it was unnecessary to create 
those boundaries.200 Justice Alito argued, “[w]e need not identify with 
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, 
for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”201 Justice 
Alito’s analysis indicates that the constitutionality of the issue directly 
depends on the length of time of the surveillance.202 His skepticism 
applying established doctrines to new technological capacities is echoed 
in his request that the legislature act. In his Jones concurrence, Justice 
Alito tipped his hat at the legislature’s quick enactment of federal 
wiretap laps after the Katz decision established the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test: “Congress promptly enacted a 
comprehensive statute . . . and, since that time, the regulation of 
wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case 
law.”203 Justice Alito asked for a similar legislative response post-
Jones.204 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also briefly addressed the related 
privacy issues: 
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
warrantless disclosure to the government of a list of every Web 
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. . . . I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.205 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion does not align with the third party 
doctrine as explained in United States v. Miller, where the Court held 
voluntary disclosure to a third party removes an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.206 Instead, her concurrence indicates the third 
party doctrine is not conducive to analyzing an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a modern age where a third party, such as an 
ISP, has collected and stored aggregate amounts of information.207 The 
                                                     
which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular 
attitude.” Id. at 427. 
200. Id. at 430. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 430–31. 
203. Id. at 427–28. 
204. Id. at 429.  
205. Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
206. Id. at 417–18.  
207. Id. at 417. 
15 - Aitchison.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:41 PM 
2018] PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 1047 
 
Jones concurrences show that the Court’s application of traditional 
Fourth Amendment doctrines has logical limitations even without 
explicit, controlling action by the Supreme Court. 
III. ANALYZING THE FAILURES OF ECPA AND A POSSIBLE 
SOLUTION FOR COURTS 
Neither Fourth Amendment jurisprudence nor ECPA is equipped to 
regulate the constitutionality of government searches in a time when so 
much personal data is held in the Cloud.208 Modern technology, 
particularly the Cloud, requires a new analysis because the way 
technology is used today is vastly different than how it’s been used in 
earlier times. For example, while analogies may be drawn between the 
government’s ability to intercept a letter and the government’s ability to 
intercept an email, the comparison to letters fails to acknowledge the 
increasing ease with which parties can identify and locate specific pieces 
of data about specific individuals in the Cloud.209 Tech companies 
continue to have increased capacity to store, aggregate, and locate 
specific consumer data.210 As one commentator noted, 
What does all this mean in terms of the Fourth Amendment? It’s 
simple: the technological and human factors that constrained the 
gathering and processing of data in the past are fast 
disappearing. Prior to these “advances,” even the most ill-
intentioned government urges to intrude on and do away with 
the privacy of citizens were held in check by the possible. The 
techno-gloves are now off and the possible is increasingly 
whatever an official or bureaucrat wants to do. That means 
violations of the Fourth Amendment are held in check only by 
the goodwill of the government, which might have qualified as 
the ultimate nightmare of those who wrote the Constitution.211 
A. ECPA in Its Current Form Is Not the Answer 
Although the original intent of ECPA—and of subsequent 
amendments to ECPA—was to bring privacy law into the digital age, it 
has largely failed to address the implications of technological advances 
                                                     
208. Peter Van Buren, 4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Won’t Protect You Anymore, 
MOTHERJONES (June 26, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/how-
fourth-amendment-not-protect [https://perma.cc/734J-P2NA]. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
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and privacy protections in a way that provides adequate guidance for 
courts.212 ECPA’s language reflects the type of technology that was 
available in the 1980s when it was first enacted.213 The massive leaps in 
technology between the 1980s and now goes without saying. Even at 
that time, ECPA was playing catch-up, trying to update the previous act 
to keep the relationship between law enforcement and private citizens 
modern in light of advancing technology.214 ECPA is not only ill-
equipped to address technological changes since its enactment, it is also 
incapable of addressing technological changes that are still to come.215 
Technological inadequacies aside, the law also fails in other ways. 
Although ECPA was written to deal with electronic searches, it provides 
less protection than similar statutes that deal with physical searches.216 
While section 2705(b), guiding the use of indefinite gag orders, is just 
one provision of ECPA, it is vital because it regulates the fundamental 
warrant, consumer notification, and access requirements.217 Microsoft’s 
2016 complaint challenging the government’s use of ECPA’s indefinite 
gag orders strongly highlights this dynamic when it identifies that ECPA 
section 2705(b) is different from physical search regulation statutes 
because the analogous physical search statute requires a notification of 
search within thirty days without indefinite gag orders.218 Therefore, the 
                                                     
212. McMurry, supra note 25, at 598–99. 
While the ECPA represented significant progress for privacy general when it was passed in 
1986, technology has continued to outpace the law. The ECPA was required to update the 1968 
Act in order to preserve privacy rights in light of advances in technology. Similarly, the ECPA 
has been made less relevant and less effective due to subsequent advances in technology which 
have occurred even more rapidly [than] between the passage of the 1968 Act and the ECPA. 
Laws concerning privacy must be clear, easily applicable, and up-to-date so as to safeguard 
this valuable right. Because the ECPA has proven itself to be unclear and confusing, especially 
in light of advances in technology, it needs to be amended to promote privacy in an 
increasingly technological world.  
Id. ECPA has been amended since this article was published but arguably not to the extent 
necessary to make McMurry’s statement out-of-date.  
213. Oza, supra note 51, at 1045. 
214. McMurry, supra note 25, at 614. 
215. Alyson Shontell, The Next 20 Years Are Going to Make the Last 20 Look Like We 
Accomplished Nothing in Tech, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.businessin 
sider.com/the-future-of-technology-will-pale-the-previous-20-years-2014-6 [https://perma.cc/E3JV-
FBNS] (“[T]he next 20 years are going to make this last 20 years just pale . . . .  
We’re just at the beginning of the beginning of all these kind of changes. There’s a sense that all the 
big things have happened, but relatively speaking, nothing big has happened yet.” (citing Kevin 
Kelly, founder of Wired)). 
216. Grounds for Issuing Search Warrants, 18 U.S.C. § 3103 (2012). 
217. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
218. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 8–9, 11. The statute that deals with 
physical searches requires a person whose documents are being searched to be notified within thirty 
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law provides government investigators with significantly more leeway 
(an extra two months of search time with significantly better search 
techniques) when searching an individual’s digital rather than physical 
storage. 
The recent changes to the laws affecting access to consumer data are a 
mixed bag. Taking the lead from the Department of Justice’s new 
policy,219 implementing limitations for indefinite gag orders as a 
statutory scheme is a good first step to cure ECPA’s failures. Particularly 
through the indefinite gag order loophole, the Act provides fewer 
protections for consumers.220 However, the introduction of the CLOUD 
Act221 undermines ECPA and the newly implemented DOJ Policy. The 
CLOUD Act is ultimately a move backward. The recent and directly 
conflicting proposals for ECPA guidance from the federal government 
demonstrate how strongly comprehensive data protection reform is 
needed. 
Compounding ECPA’s shortcomings is the fact that technology 
typically evolves exponentially.222 Using ECPA as a privacy protection 
in 2018 is akin to using a fax machine to send an email. Congress’s lack 
of affirmative action enables lower courts to enact significantly different 
standards, particularly related to indefinite gag orders. This leaves the 
fundamental element of Fourth Amendment law—how data is 
collected—inadequately addressed. Congress’s failure to enact 
comprehensive reform has left the door open for patchwork policies223 
and new laws224 that conflict with each other and are peripheral to, but 
do not explicitly fix, the recognized problems with ECPA.225 
                                                     
days of the search happening. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3). This statute permits limited exceptions 
under which that notification period can be extended. Id. § 3103a(c). 
219. DOJ Memo, supra note 66. 
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b); Andrew Crocker & Nate Cardozo, Here’s How We’re Fighting Back 
Against “Secret” Search Warrants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/07/eff-access-now-cdt-and-oti-fight-back-against-secret-search-
warrants [https://perma.cc/C7MR-HZMY]. 
221. Tom Krazit, As Congress Considers the Tech-Backed CLOUD Act, Privacy and Human 
Rights Groups Raise Concerns, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 18, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/ 
2018/congress-considers-tech-backed-cloud-act-privacy-human-rights-groups-raise-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/MNB3-U7V4]. 
222. Peter Diamandis, Why Tech Is Accelerating, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-diamandis/why-tech-is-accelerating_b_8951550.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Y2J-NKAC] (referring to the exponential evolution of technology as the Law of 
Accelerating Returns). 
223. DOJ Memo, supra note 66. 
224. Krazit, supra note 55. 
225. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214–16. 
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B. Courts Are Ill-Equipped to Draw Arbitrary Lines Related to 
Constitutional Provisions and Technology; the Legislature Must 
Act 
Courts’ inconsistent analysis and the differing outcomes applying 
section 2705(b) show that the statute is practically unworkable and 
inconsistently applied. The cases examined throughout this Comment226 
show that judges making these rulings are hyper-aware of public opinion 
and growing concerns over government surreptitiously accessing large 
swaths of consumer data. Without action by the legislature, courts are 
left without adequate tools to examine the constitutionality of ECPA in 
relation to the acquisition of extensive consumer data stored in the 
Cloud, and individuals are left with inconsistent search outcomes across 
jurisdictions. Throughout the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on 
technology and the Fourth Amendment, the majority ping-pongs 
between failing to give technology special examination and recognizing 
that technology demands a distinct analysis with stronger Fourth 
Amendment protections.227 This inconsistent analysis shows a larger 
fault in the Court’s ability to understand and aptly apply technological 
differences. 
While the majority in Riley based its decision on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of advances in technology, Justice Alito was 
not convinced the Court was the best entity to decipher the relationship 
between advanced technology and the Fourth Amendment. In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito said he would reevaluate the matter if 
Congress created “reasonable distinctions” relating to privacy and 
technology:228 “I would reconsider the question presented here if either 
Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation . . . .”229 Most 
recently, the government’s brief in the Carpenter case reflects a similar 
sentiment: 
If Congress and state legislatures share petitioner’s concern 
about the type and quantity of information collected by cell-
service providers and other third parties, those legislators can 
pass laws to limit the collection, use, or dissemination of that 
data. Rather than distort or arbitrarily limit Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological 
                                                     
226. Supra section I.B.; supra Part II. 
227. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487–89 (2014); cf. United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012); supra notes 156 to 194 and accompanying text. 
228. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).  
229. Id. 
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change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be 
legislative.”230 
The legislature is well-equipped to create comprehensive reform. 
First, the legislature can take input from concerned and affected parties 
and adjust its laws accordingly.231 Second, it has the power to engage in 
extensive debate and listen to more voices.232 The affected tech 
companies may have more impact on the Senate floor than the court 
room through lobbying efforts, particularly when the consumers have no 
idea they are subject to searches.233 Third, it has the power to create laws 
based on policy, not just interpret them.234 Taking into account diverse 
opinions and considerations is vital to enacting a complex statutory 
scheme, such as an ECPA update. This is something courts simply do 
not have the tools, time, or resources to do. Therefore, the legislature 
should govern the complex relationship between the Fourth Amendment 
and technology. It should not leave the courts to decipher a thirty-year-
old statute ill-equipped to provide adequate guidance to courts, 
companies, and consumers. 
This call to action has been echoed before. Academics,235 judges,236 
lawyers237 have all recognized the legislature as the right branch of 
government to reform ECPA and advocated it to do so. Indeed, 
Professor Orin Kerr provides a comprehensive guide to amending the 
statute.238 In Jones, Justice Alito established that congressional response 
to courts issuing holdings about complicated areas of constitutional law 
was not without precedent. After Katz, the legislature acted. The same 
comprehensive legislative action must happen now. As written, ECPA’s 
regulations do not adequately address societal expectations in 2018. 
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C. The Court Should Treat Digital Data as Fundamentally Distinct 
Rather than Drawing Attenuated Comparisons to Traditional 
Surveillance Techniques 
Courts throughout the country are left in a predicament. As recent 
history has demonstrated, the judiciary is not the correct branch of 
government to create detailed and comprehensive rules relating to 
technology.239 The legislature has also not provided adequate guidance 
for dealing with Cloud technology in the Fourth Amendment realm. As 
Professor Orin Kerr wrote, 
The SCA [ECPA] is not a catch-all statute designed to protect 
the privacy of stored Internet communications; instead it is 
narrowly tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like 
protections for computer networks. Unfortunately, some judges 
have had a difficult time realizing this, and have twisted the 
statute to do things it was never intended to do.240 
If Congress fails to act on ECPA,241 courts can still take some positive 
action, despite the problems outlined above. One solution could be for 
courts to explicitly acknowledge that technology deserves distinct 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment.242 
Courts should first recognize that digital Cloud data is fundamentally 
different than any other type of data previously obtained by the 
government.243 Following the trend established by the Sixth Circuit in 
Warshak, and as opined in Riley, the fundamental difference between the 
capacity of cell phones to store, search, aggregate, and analyze data, and 
the capacity of an individual to write down a few names in an address 
book illuminates the need for digital data to be analyzed differently.244 
The Warshak opinion lays out the fundamental distinction well: 
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have 
waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based 
                                                     
239. Supra Part III.  
240. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214. 
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communication has taken place. People are now able to send 
sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, 
family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange 
sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with 
the click of a mouse button. Commerce has also taken hold in 
email. Online purchases are often documented in email 
accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and 
clients of imminent appointments. . . . Much hinges, therefore, 
on whether the government is permitted to request that a 
commercial ISP turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails 
without triggering the machinery of the Fourth Amendment.245 
The use of the Cloud only increases that technological capacity and 
strengthens the argument for digital data to be treated differently under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Alito has further alluded to this important distinction in his 
push to treat data different when collected in the aggregate compared to 
when collected as individual data points.246 As Justice Alito stated in his 
Jones concurrence, “[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation has been 
that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the 
main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single 
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”247 The use of 
technology should not usurp this expectation of privacy, and courts 
should explicitly find Cloud data searches using advanced technology 
are fundamentally distinct from the searches of the past. 
Justice Alito’s sentiment, for example, directly relates to the use of 
indefinite gag orders under ECPA. Although indefinite gag orders 
cannot be directly compared to the issue in Jones because they require 
some level of judicial scrutiny and, in each scenario, the government 
acquired different kinds of information, the use of indefinite gag orders 
to obtain a continuous and significant amount of consumer data is 
exactly the type of concern Justice Alito addresses in his Jones 
concurrence.248 Under Justice Alito’s reasoning,249 also echoed by 
Justice Sotomayor,250 a limitation on the amount of data gathered 
through indefinite gag orders would be required under the Fourth 
Amendment. When the acquisition of nearly four weeks of individual 
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location data is beyond the reasonable expectation for continuous 
acquisition,251 nearly a year’s worth of the information from an 
individual’s ISP must also be beyond the limit, particularly when it was 
obtained without a warrant. Echoing concerns over the acquisition of 
significant amount of customer data obtained through indefinite gag 
orders and the desire to treat digital data differently, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation has noted, “[t]here are strong arguments that 
Section 2705 nondisclosure orders are unconstitutional all or nearly all 
of the time.”252 Recognizing that digital data is fundamentally distinct 
from traditional forms of surveillance because of its unprecedented 
acquisition and storage capacity is vital if courts are to create outcomes 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and across jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The tangled mess of ECPA and the Fourth Amendment provide 
inadequate guidance to lower courts on the government’s ability to 
collect and disseminate consumer information stored in the Cloud by 
technology companies. Simply put, ECPA is antiquated when it comes 
to modern technology.253 Neither the drafters of the Constitution nor the 
authors of ECPA had any way to know that nearly every individual in 
the United States would constantly carry a computer more powerful than 
those that launched the Apollo rockets254 and then passively provide all 
that information to third parties without any affirmative action on the 
part of the consumer. Courts’ inconsistent application of ECPA’s 
indefinite gag order provision show they are not well-equipped to 
engage in technological analysis without up-to-date legislative tools.255 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fails to address 
the important technological and privacy issues that are becoming more 
commonplace.256 Courts are left trying to cut through a Fourth 
Amendment fog with only outdated statutes and inconsistent 
jurisprudence to guide them. Comprehensive regulation of digital data 
searches should be the legislature’s job.257 In the meantime, courts 
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should at least recognize the fundamental difference in scope between 
collecting digital data and physical data—illustrated in Riley v. 
California258 and United States v. Warshak259—when examining the 
validity of government entities gathering private citizens’ data from 
third-party private companies. 
                                                     
258. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014). 
259. 631 F.3d 266, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2010). 
